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Abstract
We implement the Rawlsian thought experiment of a veil of ignorance in
the laboratory which introduces risk and possibly social preferences. We nd
that both men and women react to the risk introduced by the veil of igno-
rance. Only the women additionally exhibit social preferences that reect an
increased concern for equality. Our results for women imply that maximin
preferences can also be derived from a combination of some, not necessarily
innite risk aversion and social preferences. This result contrasts the Utilitar-
ians claim that maximin preferences necessarily represent preferences with
innite risk aversion.
Keywords: veil of ignorance, social preferences, equality, e¢ ciency, experi-
ment
JEL classication: D63, D64, C99
1 Introduction
We present an experiment that explores the relationship between social preferences
and the maximin principle. According to Rawls (1971), behind the veil of ignorance
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society would agree that the maximin principle should constitute the basis of the
social contract. Behind the veil of ignorance, nobody knows which future position he
(as well as other individuals) will be assigned to when deciding how to distribute re-
sources across di¤erent positions. The maximin principle states that society should
maximize the utility of the individual that is worst o¤. Utilitarians have claimed
that voting for the maximin principle is only optimal for innitely risk averse indi-
viduals. However, this argument assumes that everybody is only interested in his
own material payo¤. If people have social preferences they could be in favor of an
egalitarian distribution even if they are risk neutral.
Theories on social preferences assume that people are self-interested to some
degree, but also care about the (payo¤s of) others.1 In our experiment, subjects are
exposed to a decision situation behind the veil of ignorance. Implementing the veil
of ignorance we are able to measure social preferences that are free of self-interest
("impartial social preferences"). In other words, impartial social preferences are
an individuals preferences over distributions of payo¤s to himself and his reference
group when being selsh is not possible. Information on peoples impartial social
preferences can be useful for many aspects of policy design, e.g. the design of a tax,
a social security or a public health insurance system. Imagine, as an example for
eliciting social preferences, a survey in which you ask a poor person whether he is
in favor of more redistribution. If you get the answer yesyou cannot interpret it
unambiguously: does it mean that this person prefers more redistribution because
he is likely to prot from it? Or does this person have an innate preference for a
more equal society? In contrast, if you had asked this person in the situation behind
the veil of ignorance and had received the (now impartial) answer yesyou would
have known that the latter is true (or that this person is risk averse).
Besides potentially introducing impartial social preferences, the veil of ignorance
introduces risk. We use a second, nearly identical control treatment to isolate a
subjects risk preferences. If we nd no di¤erence between the behavior in the treat-
ment implementing the veil of ignorance and the control treatment the claim that
the maximin principle can only be derived from innite risk aversion is correct. As-
sume in contrast that we observe a signicant di¤erence between the two treatments
and the impartial social preferences measured in the treatment implementing the
veil of ignorance reect an increased concern for equality. Then the maximin prin-
1Focusing on the distribution of payo¤s the notion of social preferences we use is most closely
related to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). For a recent survey on the
literature on social preferences see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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ciple could also be derived from a combination of some, not necessarily innite risk
aversion and impartial social preferences.
Our experimental design is based on a dictator game. A dictator game is a two
player game in which the rst player, the dictator, proposes a split of a given pie.
The second player, the receiver, has a purely passive role. Both players are paid
according to the dictators proposal.2 The dictator game used in this experiment
has two additional features. First, it is characterized by an e¢ ciency loss of 50% for
units that are transferred from the dictator to the receiver. Consequently, a trade
o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency3 arises: a more equal allocation can only be
achieved by transferring more which in turn induces a larger e¢ ciency loss. Second,
we implement the veil of ignorance by introducing role uncertainty: each participant
decides how many units of a 12 unit pie the dictator will give away to the receiver
before he is randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver with equal probability.
Finally, each participants decision will be implemented as the dictators choice
irrespective of whether the decision maker has been assigned the dictator or the
receiver role. Implementing the veil of ignorance removes the possibility to act
self-interestedly and at the same time, introduces risk.
We use a three treatment design: the benchmark case is the dictator game treat-
ment that corresponds to a classical dictator game with an e¢ ciency loss and no
role uncertainty. The impartiality treatment is characterized by the same e¢ ciency
loss, but adds role uncertainty. The risk treatment is the same as the impartiality
treatment except for one di¤erence: it is a one person game in which each partic-
ipant decides how to allocate the pie across the states of being dictator or being
receiver and is randomly assigned the position of either dictator or receiver after-
wards. However, the position not assigned to the decision maker is not lled in by
a second person.
Comparing the behavior in the dictator game and the impartiality treatment
sheds light on the di¤erences between social preferences without and behind the veil
of ignorance. The risk and the impartiality treatment di¤er only with respect to
whether the second person exists or not, i.e. whether impartial social preferences
could be present besides the risk motive. Comparing the results of these two treat-
ments we can nd out whether impartial social preferences play a role behind the
veil of ignorance and whether they induce an increased concern for equality or for
2The classical dictator game was rst introduced by Forsythe et al. (1994).
3In this paper, a more e¢ cient allocation is dened as an allocation with a higher sum of payo¤s
of both players.
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e¢ ciency.
We nd that social preferences without and behind the veil of ignorance clearly
di¤er for all subjects. Behind the veil of ignorance only a minority of subjects opts
for the maximin principle. The vast majority of male participants perceive the veil
of ignorance as introducing only risk. In contrast, for women, impartial social prefer-
ences are a second signicant motivation that induces a stronger concern for equality.
Our results for women imply that maximin preferences can also be derived from a
combination of some, not necessarily innite risk aversion and impartial social pref-
erences. The results are well in line with the current literature on gender di¤erences
in social preferences and risk attitudes. We complement this literature by o¤ering
new insights in gender di¤erences with respect to impartial social preferences.
Only few other experiments in economics have elicited impartial social prefer-
ences. In Engelmann and Strobel (2004), the decision makers task is to choose
among three di¤erent allocations of payo¤s across three persons that represent an
e¢ ciency-equality trade o¤. Since the decision makers payo¤ is constant across all
three allocations the experimental design controls for self-interest. In contrast to the
idea of the veil of ignorance that is reected in our experiment, a constant payo¤ for
the decision maker implies that he is not a¤ected by his own choice. This might have
an important inuence on the observed decision behavior: First, the decision maker
has no monetary incentives to reveal his true preferences.4 Furthermore, imagine
a decision maker who prefers a very e¢ cient, but highly unequal allocation. If he
chooses the unequal allocation he "punishes" some of the other subjects while being
on the safe side himself. In contrast, in our experiment, the decision maker himself
risks getting a very low payo¤ when choosing an unequal allocation. The latter
setting seems more appropriate to measure impartial social preferences behind the
veil of ignorance.
Some other economic experiments explicitly refer to the Rawlsian veil of ig-
norance. Johannesson and Gerdtham (1995), Beckman et al. (2002), Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002), Carlsson et al. (2003) as well as Carlsson et al. (2005)
basically let subjects who do not yet know the place they will occupy in a given
society choose between societies that di¤er with respect to mean income and dis-
tribution of income. Ackert et al. (2004) ask subjects to vote in favor of either a
lump-sum or a progressive tax regime before they are randomly assigned a pre-tax
payo¤. To be able to interpret the observed behavior in terms of impartial social
4Additionally, sensitivity to framing e¤ects might rise as participants do not have to act on the
endorsed fairness ideals (compare Cappelen et al., 2005, p.2).
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preferences, all mentioned experiments have to assume that subjects are risk neu-
tral. Otherwise, the observed behavior can only be interpreted as the result of either
risk aversion or impartial social preferences. The new contribution of our experi-
ment is that we are able to separate the e¤ects of risk aversion and impartial social
preferences in a veil of ignorance setting.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The details of the experi-
mental design are explained in section 2. Section 3 presents the hypotheses to be
tested and links them to the experimental design. Results are provided in section 4
that also elaborates on the striking di¤erences in the behavior of male and female
participants. In the last section, we conclude.
2 Experimental Design
The experimental design is based on a dictator game. Since the receiver has a purely
passive role the dictator game is one of the simplest ways to elicit the dictators social
preferences that do not interfere with any strategic considerations. Furthermore,
the dictator game is easy to understand experimental subjects. In our experiment,
dictators have to decide how to split a 12 unit pie.
Our version of the dictator game has two additional features. First, it is char-
acterized by an e¢ ciency loss of 50% for units transferred from the dictator to the
receiver. This e¢ ciency loss introduces a trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency
and can be interpreted as a deadweight loss that arises as the cost of redistribu-
tion. While an e¢ ciency loss of 50% might seem very large at rst sight, it is easy
to calculate for the experimental subjects and makes the results of our experiment
comparable to those obtained in Andreoni and Miller (2002). As the dictator can
only transfer integer units, the following allocations are possible results of the game:
Table 1: Possible allocations (in units)
dictator 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
receiver 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
5The veil of ignorance has also been the subject of experimental inquiries in other disciplines
such that political sciences and psychology (Brickman, 1977; Curtis, 1979; Frohlich et al., 1987;
Bond and Park, 1991; Mitchell, 1993).
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There are two focal points among these allocations: the allocation (12,0) rep-
resents the most e¢ cient one (and at the same time, the one an egoistic dictator
would choose). An individual with maximin preferences or, more generally, a very
strong concern for equality would choose the allocation (4,4). Transferring more
than necessary to achieve the equal split allocation (4,4) is hard to rationalize: the
resulting allocations impose an enormous e¢ ciency loss and add inequality.
A second specic feature of the dictator game is that we implement the veil of
ignorance by introducing role uncertainty: First, every participant has to decide how
many units the dictator will transfer. Only after that roles (dictator and receiver)
are randomly assigned and pairs consisting of one dictator and one receiver are
matched. Finally, every participants decision will be implemented as the dictators
choice independent of whether the decision maker has been randomly assigned the
role of dictator or receiver.6 A subject that has been assigned the receiver (dictator)
role will be paid the receivers (dictators) payo¤ according to his own decision
how many units the dictator will transfer to the receiver. Implementing the veil
of ignorance as described above induces both risk and impartial social preferences.
To be able to isolate impartial social preferences from risk considerations and to
test the hypothesis that the veil of ignorance is only a concept about risk we have
to separate the e¤ects of risk and impartial social preferences on subjectsdecision
behavior.
This is achieved by a three treatment design. All three treatments are based on
the dictator game and share the feature of a 50% e¢ ciency loss for units transferred.
The impartiality treatment is a dictator game with a 50% e¢ ciency loss and role
uncertainty. The decision observed in the impartiality treatment reects a subjects
impartial social preferences in a risky environment. The risk treatment di¤ers from
the impartiality treatment in just one respect. It is a one person game and conse-
quently, basically a lottery decision: rst, each subject decides how to allocate the
pie across the states of being the dictator or being the receiver. After that decision
each subject is randomly assigned the role of either dictator or receiver with equal
probability. In contrast to the impartiality treatment, there is no second person
who lls in the role that has not been assigned to the decision maker. The data
obtained in the risk treatment simply reect the individual degree of risk aversion.7
6This is possible as each subject also serves as a dummy player in another subjects decision.
Subjects are told so only at the end of the experiment.
7The experimental design cannot distinguish between subjects who are risk neutral and those
who are risk loving. Both will choose the (12,0) allocation. This might be a aw as, ceteris paribus,
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The third treatment, the dictator game treatment, serves as a benchmark case and
measures (partial) social preferences: it corresponds to a classical dictator game with
an e¢ ciency loss and no role uncertainty. Table 2 summarizes the three treatments.
Table 2: the three treatment design
treatment characteristics what is
e¢ ciency role number of measured?
loss uncertainty players
dictator yes no 2 social
game preferences
impartiality yes yes 2 impartial social
preferences
with risk
risk yes yes 1 risk aversion
The experiment was conducted single-blindly. Each subject participated in two
out of the three treatments: in the risk treatment and randomly in one of the two
two-player treatments, either the dictator game or the impartiality treatment. After
all subjects had made their rst decision, we announced that there would be a second
and absolutely last experiment ("false restart"). To avoid income e¤ects we did not
give subjects any feedback on the result of the rst treatment before they were paid
at the end of the whole session.8
At each time of the experiment half of the subjects played the risk treatment.
These subjects were matched with the other half of subjects who played one of the
two two-player treatments in the same room at the same time. This matching across
treatments has two advantages: rst, not only in the risk, but also in the impartiality
and the dictator game treatment every subjects decision is in fact implemented (and
every subject knows this). By this, we avoid introducing an additional source of risk
in the impartiality treatment, namely whether ones own decision or the one of
ones matched partner will be implemented. Consequently, we manage to restrict
a more risk loving individual will let the dictator transfer less in the impartiality treatment, a
decision that we will interpret to be caused by a concern for e¢ ciency. To avoid this problem we
could have run a second version of the risk treatment with an e¢ ciency gain instead of loss to
explicitly measure the individual degree risk loving. We did not do that as we do not expect risk
loving to be a major concern.
8Subjects could nevertheless calculate the expected amount of money they had earned in the
rst treatment.
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the di¤erence between the risk and the impartiality treatment to the (non-)existence
of the second person. Second, we maximize the number of observations as we avoid
paying passive players. As a result of the matching, each subject had three sources
of payo¤ at the end of the session: the payo¤ from his own risk decision, a payo¤
from his own decision in one of the two two-player treatments and a payo¤ from his
randomly assigned partners decision in one of the two two-player treatments.
A description of the order of events during each session, a translated version of
the instructions and the corresponding control questions can be found in Appendix
6.1. The experiment was programmed using the experimental software zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 1999) and conducted at the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 at
the University of Mannheim, Germany in November 2005. The experiments lasted
about one hour and subjects earned about 16 Euros on average. In sum, we collected
131 observations on decisions in the impartiality treatment, 167 in the risk and 36 in
the dictator game treatment. All 167 participants9 were university students with a
large variety of subjects. The main characteristics of the participants are displayed
in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Composition of treatments
dictator game risk impartiality
treatment treatment treatment
number of observations 36 167 131
sex 19 (F)/17(M) 59(F)/108(M) 40(F)/91(M)
mean age 23.56 23.77 23.82
knowledge in economics* 66.67% 64.67% 64.12%
*: includes students studying economics or business administration as minor or major
3 Evaluation strategy and hypotheses
Using the three treatment design depicted in Table 2 we can answer the following
questions: Does the veil of ignorance make a di¤erence? By contrasting the number
of units transferred in the dictator game and the impartiality treatment, we compare
9We admitted only an even number of subjects to the experiment but one subject left during
the course of the experiment. His role was lled by one of the experimenters and the corresponding
observations were deleted.
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social preferences and impartial social preferences with risk for a given trade o¤ be-
tween equality and e¢ ciency. Put di¤erently, we compare distributional preferences
without and behind the veil of ignorance.
Hypothesis 1
There is no signicant di¤erence between social preferences and impartial social
preferences with risk that are measured in the dictator game and the impartiality
treatment respectively.
If we can reject hypothesis 1 the next step will be to ask whether the observed
di¤erence can be completely explained by risk aversion: Is the veil of ignorance
only a concept introducing risk? Or in contrast, are impartial social preferences an
additional motivation behind the veil of ignorance?
Hypothesis 2
There is no signicant di¤erence between risk preferences and impartial social
preferences with risk that are measured in the risk and the impartiality treatment
respectively.
The only di¤erence between the risk and the impartiality treatment is the exis-
tence or non-existence of a second person who is a¤ected by the decision makers
choice. Consequently, the treatments di¤er only in whether impartial social pref-
erences can possibly exist as a second motive besides the same risk motive. If we
cannot reject hypothesis 2 we will conclude that the thought experiment of a veil
of ignorance has correctly been perceived by economists as a concept inducing only
risk aversion. The only way to derive Rawlsdi¤erence principle is to assume in-
nite risk aversion and maximin preferences represent an appropriate formalization
of the di¤erence principle. In contrast, if hypothesis 2 can be rejected impartial so-
cial preferences will be a further signicant motivation behind the veil of ignorance.
Consequently, the di¤erence principle can also be considered the result of some, less
than innite risk aversion and impartial social preferences - in case impartial social
preferences induce an increased concern for equality.10
10While the term "veil of ignorance" was coined by Rawls, Harsanyi (1953, 1955) already used the
same thought experiment. Harsanyi interprets value judgments made behind the veil of ignorance
to reect choices involving just risk (and not social preferences) and assumes that agents are
risk neutral. Consequently, he predicts e¢ ciency seeking behavior to prevail behind the veil of
ignorance. In terms of our experiment, Harsanyis argument would be supported if we found
that subjects do not transfer any units in the risk treatment (risk-neutrality) and if di¤erences in
subjectsbehavior across the risk and the impartiality treatment were not signicant.
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This is investigated by hypothesis 3: given that impartial social preferences
introduce an additional motive, do they induce an increased concern for equality
or for e¢ ciency? To which extent does a veil of ignorance like situation induce
maximin preferences as predicted by Rawls? The combination of role uncertainty
and e¢ ciency loss reected by the data of the impartiality treatment enables us to
answer these questions.
Hypothesis 3
Behind the veil of ignorance, subjects behave according to maximin preferences.
4 Results
4.1 Gender di¤erences
There is a growing literature on gender di¤erences in risk attitudes as well as gen-
erosity in giving. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001, p.305) conclude that there are
systematic di¤erences by sex, and these can have important and interesting conse-
quences for economic behaviorand plead for more attention to sex di¤erences in
experimental economics. We will take their claim seriously and check whether we
nd gender di¤erences in our data.
In total, we had 108 male (65%) and 59 female (35%) participants. Table 4
displays the mean number of units not transferred by sex and treatment as well
as test results for whether medians and distributions of the number of units not
transferred di¤er for men and women within each treatment.11
In sum, we can observe striking di¤erences in the behavior of men and women:
using the Mann-Whitney test, we nd that the distributions of units not transferred
di¤er signicantly across men and women both in the risk and in the impartiality
treatment. The same is true for medians. In the impartiality treatment, the absolute
di¤erence in the mean is largest and amounts to about 2.2 units for men and women.
In general, results are extremely well in line with the existing literature: in
the impartiality treatment, we nd that women are more concerned about equality,
11The complete experimental data are displayed by treatment and sex in Appendix 6.2. To
obtain means and test statistics we have pooled the data of all risk and impartiality treatments
respectively. Test results presented in Appendix 6.3 reveal that this is legitimate: both in the risk
and in the impartiality treatment the distributions of units not transferred do not di¤er signicantly
across di¤erent treatment orders. There are no order e¤ects for both men and women separately
as well as for the data pooled across sexes.
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Table 4: gender di¤erences by treatments
treatment mean men mean women Mann-Whitney Median
test* test*
dictator game 11.24 (17 obs.) 9.63 (19 obs.) p=0.061 p=0.091**
risk 9.28 (108 obs.) 8.31 (59 obs.) p=0.014 p=0.016
impartiality 9.19 (91 obs.) 7.00 (40 obs.) p=0.000 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
**: In the dictator game treatment, the median corresponds to keeping all 12 units.
We can only obtain a test result if we assign observations that equal the median to
the group of observations greater than the median instead of to the group lower than the
median as we do in all other Median tests reported.
while men care more about e¢ ciency. Replicating Engelmann and Strobels (2004)
experiment that is similar to our impartiality treatment Fehr et al. (2006) nd that
women choose the most egalitarian allocation signicantly more often than men.
Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) play an experiment with a disinterested third-
party decision maker in which women are signicantly more likely (by 13 percentage
points) to choose an allocation resulting in equal payo¤s, while men are 9 percentage
points more likely to choose the most e¢ cient allocation.
Gender di¤erences in the risk treatment are smaller in absolute amounts, but
clearly signicant: they indicate that, on average, women are more risk-averse than
men. Reviewing the vast economic literature on gender di¤erences in risk prefer-
ences Eckel and Grossman (2006) conclude that women are characterized by a higher
degree of risk aversion than men in eld studies, while the results from laboratory
experiments are less consistent. Similarly, Croson and Gneezys (2004) survey sum-
marizes that there is clear evidence that men are more risk-taking than women in
most tasks and most populations.
Due to the small number of observations medians and distributions di¤er mar-
ginally in the dictator game treatment. We only have data on the behavior of 17 men
and 19 women, but for those behavior clearly seems to di¤er: while male dictators,
on average, transfer less than one unit, female dictators transfer nearly 2.5 units on
average. Furthermore, about 70% of male dictators keep the whole pie, while only
37% of women do. Once again, our results conrm the previous ndings: Eckel and
Grossman (1998) nd that women on average donate twice as much as men in a
classical dictator game. Dufwenberg and Muren (2005) present the results of a dic-
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tator game in which signicantly fewer men than women give non-zero amounts.12
The most detailed analysis is by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001). Playing dictator
games with di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency losses, they nd that when it is relatively
expensive to give, women are more generous than men. As the price of giving de-
creases, men begin to give more than women. For our parameter constellation, a
50% e¢ ciency loss, they nd that women are signicantly more generous than men.
In sum, we are safe to conclude that men and women do not behave in the same
way in our experiment. Consequently, we will focus on analyzing the data for men
and women separately. We also present a joint analysis for the sake of completeness
and to guarantee comparability of our results in the dictator game treatment to
other dictator game studies.
4.2 Does the veil of ignorance make a di¤erence?
Before turning to our hypotheses we will briey compare our results in the dictator
game treatment to those of other studies on dictator games that vary the price of
giving. In our dictator game treatment, subjects on average give away 13% of the
pie. With the same 50% e¢ ciency loss and a similar pie size, they transfer 10% in
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and 21% in Andreoni and Miller (2002). In Fisman
et al. (2005), for an e¢ ciency loss of 30% or above, 60% of subjects transfer less
than 5% of the pie, 17% transfer 5-15% of the pie, 10% 15-25% of the pie, while
the remaining subjects transfer more. The corresponding gures in our experiment
are astonishingly similar: 52.8%, 16.7% and 11.1%, respectively. Compared to the
already existing data our results seem very reasonable.
We now return to hypothesis 1 and discuss whether social preferences and im-
partial social preferences do di¤er. If we were to nd that they do we might want
to question the use of peoples stated social preferences from surveys and alike as a
basis for "just" policy design. Our data would then suggest using impartially stated
social preferences.
Result 1
There is a large and signicant di¤erence between social preferences and impartial
social preferences with risk.
12In contrast Bolton and Katok (1995) nd no systematic gender di¤erences in a classical dictator
game.
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Table 5: test results for hypothesis 1
mean dictator mean impartiality Mann-Whitney Median
game treatment treatment test* test*
all 10.39 8.52 p=0.000 p=0.000
men 11.24 9.19 p=0.003 p=0.018
women 9.63 7.00 p=0.002 p=0.000
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
Hypothesis 1 can unambiguously be rejected according to the test results pre-
sented in Table 5: medians and distributions of the number of units not transferred
di¤er signicantly for the data pooled across sexes as well as if we analyze the be-
havior of men and women separately. Di¤erences in means are also substantial: they
amount to about two units in the whole sample. One would have expected hypoth-
esis 1 to be true only if (i) experimental subjects were risk-neutral and (ii) they
would behave impartially even if their role is known, i.e. if experimental subjects
would not exhibit any egoism or subconscious self-serving bias in the dictator game
treatment. Thus, the next step is to gure out where the signicant di¤erences be-
tween the dictator game treatment and the impartiality treatment stem from: Are
they due to risk aversion only, the prevalence of impartial social preferences in the
impartiality treatment as opposed to egoism in the dictator game treatment, or a
combination of both? Analyzing the behavior in the risk treatment, we see that
68% of all subjects (actually, 80% of female and 61% of male subjects) transfer a
positive amount despite the large e¢ ciency loss occurred. The average number of
units transferred is 3.1 for all subjects, 3.7 for women and 2.7 for men. The majority
of our subjects clearly is risk-averse.13
4.3 Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk?
We use the testing strategy outlined in hypothesis 2 to nd out whether risk aver-
sion can account for all observed di¤erences between the dictator game and the
impartiality treatment or whether impartial social preferences are also at work.
13Actually the degree of risk-aversion implied by the data is enormous. This is well in line with
many other experimental studies that document extreme values of relative risk aversion to small
or moderate risks as for example Binswanger (1981) or Schlechter (2005).
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Result 2
For female subjects impartial social preferences are a second signicant motiva-
tion behind the veil of ignorance besides risk, while this is not true for men.
4.3.1 Data analysis at the aggregate level
Table 6 presents a comparison of the aggregate data obtained in the risk and the
impartiality treatment.
Table 6: data analysis at the aggregate level
mean risk mean impartiality Mann-Whitney Median
treatment treatment test* test*
all 8.93 8.52 p=0.203 p=0.484
men 9.28 9.19 p=0.773 p=0.980
women 8.31 7.00 p=0.011 p=0.047
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
Analyzing only the data that are pooled for both sexes, we would conclude that
hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected: both medians and distributions of the number
of units not transferred do not di¤er signicantly across the two treatments. Fur-
thermore, the di¤erence in means amounts to less than half of a unit. But we
have already pointed out that considering the pooled data is highly misleading and
inadequate as the distributions reecting the behavior of men and women di¤er sig-
nicantly. Taking a closer look at the data we nd that there are strikingly di¤erent
stories going on for men and women. While hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected for men
at all, it actually can be rejected for women. For the female subjects, medians and
distributions of units not transferred do di¤er signicantly between the risk and the
impartiality treatment. In sum, the data analysis at the aggregate level reveals that
for female subjects impartial social preferences are a major motivation behind the
veil of ignorance, while this is not true for men. On average, female subjects trans-
fer about 1.3 units more in the impartiality treatment than in the risk treatment.
This is a rst indication that the e¤ect of impartial social preferences points in the
direction of an increased equality motive.
To check Rawlsprediction that maximin preferences prevail behind the veil of
ignorance, in Table 7 we categorize the data according to "strong types", that is
according to the share of subjects who decide in favor of full e¢ ciency or full equality
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in each of the two treatments.
Table 7: strong types
percentage of risk impartiality
participants choosing treatment treatment
e¢ ciency all: 32.3 all: 27.5
men: 38.9 men: 35.2
women: 20.3 women: 10.0
equality, full insurance all: 0.04 all: 13.7
men: 0.04 men: 8.8
women: 0.05 women: 25.0
Result 3
In the impartiality treatment, only 8.8% of men and 25.0% of women act accord-
ing to maximin preferences. Still for women the e¤ect of impartial social preferences
clearly is to induce an increased concern for equality.
We observe that nearly all subjects react to the large e¢ ciency loss in the risk
treatment: only very few subjects choose full insurance by equalizing payo¤s across
states. In the impartiality treatment, the share of subjects choosing full equality
increases substantially, by about 8 percentage points for men and even 25 percentage
points for women. For the pooled data, the share of people going for full e¢ ciency
is much more stable across treatments. This is essentially due to the fact that a bit
more than one third of men goes for full e¢ ciency in both the risk and the impartial-
ity treatment. In sharp contrast, the share of women opting for full e¢ ciency halves
in the impartiality treatment. Compared to the situation in the one-person risk
treatment, full e¢ ciency implies maximal inequality in the impartiality treatment.
All these ndings underline major di¤erences in the behavior of men and women:
they show that in our experiment, women exhibit impartial social preferences in a
much stronger way and are more concerned about equality than men.
4.3.2 Data analysis at the individual level
The results presented above are conrmed by the data analysis at the individual
level where we can compare an individuals decision in the risk and the impartiality
treatment. Table 8 classies subjects according to three "weak types", namely
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whether an individual does not react at all to the existence of the second person in
the impartiality treatment, whether it opts for more equality or for more e¢ ciency as
soon as the second person shows up. In total, we have observations on 131 subjects
who participated in both the risk and the impartiality treatment, 91 of them male
and 40 female.
Table 8: data analysis at the individual level (gures in per cent)
subjects who transfer ... all men women
the same amount in the risk 44 53 22.5
and the impartiality treatment
more in the impartiality 35 24 60
treatment
less in the impartiality 21 23 17.5
treatment
For more than half of the male subjects, the existence of the second person does
not add impartial social preferences as a motive, while this is only true for less
than 1/4 of female subjects.14 For those male subjects for whom impartial social
preferences play a role their e¤ect is equally likely to point in the direction of an
increased e¢ ciency or an equality motive.15 60% of women transfer more in the
impartiality treatment than in the risk treatment (3.1 units on average), but only
14Subjects who do not change their decision in the impartiality treatment as compared to the
risk treatment could simply be convinced that their allocation chosen in the risk treatment is
also the best for the second person in the impartiality treatment. While we cannot totally disap-
prove this possibility, we can be sure that these subjectsdecisions are, on average, not driven by
strong equality concerns: on average, they do transfer only 2.2 out of 12 units in the impartiality
treatment.
15With theories on inequity aversion or the Rawlsian prediction of maximin preferences in mind,
it might be astonishing that 23% of men and 17.5% of women choose to transfer fewer units in the
impartiality than in the risk treatment in which considerations about inequality are not relevant.
Our data reveal that those subjects who transfer less are substantially more risk averse than
those who transfer more. A possible explanation for why subjects transfer less in the impartiality
treatment could be that subjects maximize the sum of their own expected utility plus that of the
second person, but do not have any distributional concerns. Consequently, subjects give away
less (more) in the impartiality treatment if they perceive themselves as more (less) risk averse
than the average participant. In the nal questionnaire we asked our subjects to assess whether
in the risk treatment they had transferred more or less than the average participant. We run an
ordered logit regression to explain the di¤erence in the number of units not transferred between the
impartiality and the risk treatment. Controlling for actual risk aversion and subject characteristics,
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about 1/4 of men do (4.0 units on average). These ndings conrm that for the vast
majority of female subjects the veil of ignorance induces impartial social preferences
besides inducing risk. For them, the e¤ect of impartial social preferences clearly is
to add an equality motive. Our results for women imply that maximin preferences
can also be derived from a combination of some, not necessarily innite risk aversion
and social preferences. This result contrasts the Utilitariansclaim that maximin
preferences necessarily represent preferences with innite risk aversion.
5 Conclusion
Rawlsdeclaration that a truly just allocation of resources can only be based on im-
partial judgments is as attractive as disputable: democratic institutions rest upon
the assumption that competition of vested interests is able to balance them appro-
priately. It is not the aim of this paper to comment on this. The experimental data
presented here simply show that social preferences stated without and behind the
veil of ignorance do clearly di¤er. Behind the veil of ignorance, only a minority of
subjects behaves according to maximin preferences. Still we have presented exten-
sive evidence that behind the veil of ignorance women (in contrast to men) display
an increased concern for equality. Their choice of more equal allocations is due to
a combination of risk aversion and impartial social preferences that value equality
per se. Thus, our results challenge the Utilitariansclaim that maximin preferences
necessarily represent preferences with innite risk aversion.
On a technical level, we have presented an experimental design that achieves
to separate the e¤ects of risk and impartial social preferences behind the veil of
ignorance. Furthermore, our experiment successfully addresses the question whether
impartial social preferences induce a stronger concern for equality or e¢ ciency than
social preferences. Still, we cannot isolate impartial social preferences in a stronger
sense that would allow for an even more detailed comparison of social and impartial
social preferences. This is an open challenge for future research.
the individual perception of the own risk aversion as compared to average risk aversion is not
signicant. Consequently, our data do reect distributional concerns.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Experimental sessions, instructions and control ques-
tions
The order of events during each experimental session was the following: Subjects
were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the laboratory where they took
their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The random al-
location to a cubicle also determined the individual treatment order. Subjects were
handed out the instructions for their rst treatment and answered several comput-
erized control questions that tested their understanding of the decision situation.
Only after providing and explaining the right answers on the computer screen, we
proceeded to the decision stage of the rst treatment. After a false restart the
second treatment followed with the same procedures. We nished each experimen-
tal session by letting subjects answer a questionnaire that asked for demographic
characteristics, the strategies they had used and their expectations concerning the
behavior and attitudes of the other subjects.
Both instructions and control questions were originally in German. The trans-
lated instructions and control questions presented below are those that belong to
the impartiality treatment. The instructions and control questions for the dictator
game and the risk treatment are structured and phrased in the same way with just
one exception: to explain the risk treatment in the most natural and easiest possible
way the instructions did not mention the state of being participant A (dictator) or
B (receiver), but described the two possible states by throwing a dice and getting
either an even or an odd number. The instructions of the dictator game and the
risk treatment are available from the author.
6.1.1 Instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this economic experiment.
If you read the following instructions carefully you will be able to earn an amount
of money that depends on your own decisions. Therefore it is very important that
you read these explanations carefully. If you have any questions please do not
hesitate to ask us. Please raise your hand and we will come to your seat.
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During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other par-
ticipants, to use cell phones or to start any programs on the computer.
The neglect of these rules will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all
payments.
During the experiment we talk about points instead of Euros. Your total income
will therefore be calculated in points rst. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points obtained during the experiment will be converted in Euros at an
exchange rate of
1 point = 1 Euro.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earned income that is the
result of your decision in cash.
On the next pages we will explain the exact course of the experiment.
The Experiment
In this experiment there are two participants, A and B.
Participant A has an initial equipment of 12 points, whereas participant B has
an initial equipment of 0 points. Participant A can transfer every integer amount
between 0 and 12 points (0 and 12 included) to participant B. Every transfer leads
to the loss of half of the transferred points. This means that participant B
receives only half of a point for every full point participant A transfers
to him. Participant B does not have any inuence on the decision of participant A
and the course of the game apart from being paid half of the points transferred to
him by participant A at the end of the experiment. Participant A will be paid the
amount of points that he does not transfer.
The following table shows all possible distributions of points for participant A
and B at the end of the experiment:
A transfers to B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
As points 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Bs points 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
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The course of the experiment is the following:
Stage 1:
First, you have to decide how many points participant A transfers to participant
B. This can be done by entering the number of points that are transferred from
participant A to participant B on the following screen and pushing the OK-Button
afterwards. Note that at this stage you do not know yet whether you will
be a participant A or a participant B in stage 2. The computer has already
randomly chosen another participant with whom you form a pair.
[screen]
Stage 2:
A random decision determines whether you are assigned the role of participant
A or the one of participant B. When you are assigned the role of participant A the
participant assigned to you has the role of participant B. When you are assigned
the role of participant B the participant assigned to you has the role of participant
A. Every pair therefore consists of one real participant A and one real
participant B. Both during the experiment and afterwards neither you nor the
participant assigned to you know who the respective partner is.
Stage 3:
Your decision in stage 1 will be realized in any case, independent
from whether you are assigned to the role of participant A or B. (This is
possible because only half of the participants present in this room are taking part in
the same experiment as you do. The other half of the participants is playing another
experiment whose payo¤ does not a¤ect you at all. You are assigned a participant
from this other half.)
Example 1: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains
5:2=2.5 points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant B. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 2.5 points.
The participant assigned to you obtains 7 points.
Example 2: You decide that A transfers 5 points to B. B therefore obtains
5:2=2.5 points and A keeps 12-5=7 points. Afterwards, it is decided by drawing
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lots that you are participant A. Your decision is implemented: You obtain 7 points.
The participant assigned to you obtains 2.5 points.
This experiment is played only once. At the end of the experiment all participants
A and B are paid their income in cash.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to
answer your question.
6.1.2 Control questions
Question 1: You decide that A transfers 3 points to B. It is decided by drawing lots
that you are participant A.
How many points does B get?
How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant B be paid?
Question 2: You decide that A transfers 6 points to B. It is decided by drawing
lots that you are participant B.
How many points does B get?
How many Euros will you be paid?
How many Euros will your randomly assigned participant A be paid?
6.2 Histograms by treatment and sex
6.2.1 dictator game treatment
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6.2.2 risk treatment
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6.2.3 impartiality treatment
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6.3 Pooling and order e¤ects
In total we conducted nine sessions. In ve sessions, all subjects played the risk and
the impartiality treatment, though in di¤erent orders. In the remaining four sessions,
half of the participants rst played the risk and then the impartiality treatment,
while the other half of participants rst played the dictator game and then the risk
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treatment. The three treatment orders played by our subjects are depicted in table
9.
Table 9: treatment orders
rst treatment second treatment number of subjects
risk impartiality 83
impartiality risk 48
dictator game risk 36
Before we can pool the data obtained in one specic treatment, but from di¤erent
treatment orders we have to make sure that there are no systematic di¤erences
between di¤erent treatment orders that could, for example, be due to anchoring.
The impartiality treatment is played in two treatment orders, namely risk - im-
partiality and impartiality - risk. We use MannWhitney tests to check whether the
distributions of the number of units not transferred obtained in the two treatment
orders are statistically signicantly di¤erent. In the risk treatment, we have three
treatment orders: risk - impartiality, impartiality - risk and dictator game - risk.
The Kruskal-Wallis test checks whether the distributions of the risk treatment data
obtained in the three di¤erent treatment orders are statistically signicantly di¤er-
ent. Table 10 gives an overview on the test results concerning potential order e¤ects
in the impartiality and the risk treatment:
Table 10: test results concerning the existence of order e¤ects in the impartiality
(Mann-Whitney test) and the risk treatment (Kruskal-Wallis test)
Mann-Whitney test* Kruskal-Wallis test*
all p=0.627 0.464
men p=0.810 0.729
women p=0.505 0.816
*: The reported p-values refer to two-tailed tests and are adjusted for ties.
We nd that we can pool all decisions in the impartiality treatment as well as
those in the risk treatment irrespective of the order in which they were made for
men, for women and for both sexes jointly.
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